Thursday, November 17, 2005

CONTACT SPORTS DOCTRINE

This was a new one for me. I represent a young guy who was badly injured while performing trainer duties for a local minor league hockey club[he didn't work for the club - he worked for the rink where they practiced]. He was in the weight room when he was told to bring some water bottles out to the bench area. He got the bottles and walked directly from the weight room to the bench. What he didn't realize was that some of the hockdey players had set up bottles on the bench and were taking shots at them - sort of like target practice. Just as he entered the bench area, an errant shot hit him in the eye, causing serious harm. I filed suit on his behalf against the player and the team. The team brings a motion to dismiss, arguing that under the "contact sports doctrine" a participant injured in a team sport can only recover against another player for wilful and wanton behavior, not mere negligence. The doctrine is set forth in Osbourne v. Sprowls (Ill. 1981), 84 Ill.2d 390 and Pfister v. Shusta (Ill.1995), 167 Ill.2d 417. I didn't want to be forced to allege wilful and wanton, because I was worried about non-coverage for wilful and/or wanton allegations. Using some of the language from the Pfista case, I argued that the purpose of the doctrine was to protect players aggressively, but fairly participating in a contact sport. The act of shooting a puck at targets on a bench had nothing to do with playing hockey. The judge, after some back and forth, agreed with me and denied their motion, without prejudice to bring it again. I also argued that a trainer is really not a "participant" in a contact sport, but there was no caselaw in Illinois to support that assertion.

No comments: